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rI90 Commission on Judicial Performance. 




Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General 
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 
LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. 
• Transfers authority to remove or discipline judges from California Supreme Court to Commission 
on Judicial Performance. 
• Provides for public disciplinary proceedings against judges and former judges and specifies the 
circumstances warranting their removal, retirement, suspension, admonishment, or censure. 
• Increases non-judicial citizen membership on the Commission. 
• Specifies authority of Commission to discipline former judges. 
• Provides immunities to persons employed by or making statements to the Commission. 
• Specifies review processes for Commission determinations and requires the Supreme Court to 
issue Code of Judicial Ethics. 
Summary of Legislative Analyst's 
Estimate of Net State and Local Fiscal Impact: 
• Not likely to have a significant fiscal impact on the state. 
Final Votes Cast by the Legislature on ACA 46 (Proposition 190) 
Assembly: Ayes 74 
Noes 1· 
Senate: Ayes 29 
Noes 1 
G94 
Analysis by the Legislative Analyst 
Background 
Under the California Constitution, the Commission on 
Judicial Performance handles complaints against judges. 
The commission investigates charges of misconduct by a 
judge in office or failure or inability of a judge to perform 
his or her duties. 
The commission is composed of nine members. The 
members.include five judges, who are appointed by the 
California Supreme Court; two members of the State Bar 
of California, who are appointed by the State Bar's 
governing body; and two public members, who are 
appointed by the Governor and approved by the 
California Senate. Each member is appointed to a 
four-year term, and no member may serve more than two 
terms. 
The commission receives complaints against judges 
each year (950 complaints in 1993). The complaints and 
investigations are handled on a confidential basis. For 
less serious cases of misconduct, the commission may 
privately reprimand a judge; the Supreme Court may 
review such a reprimand. The commission may also 
publicly reprimand a judge if the judge consents. 
In other cases, the commission makes formal charges 
and a hearing is held. In 1993, nine cases (out of 950 
complaints) proceeded to a hearing. The commission may 
recommend to the Supreme Court that a judge be 
censured, retired, ot removed. Such actions may then be 
taken by the Supreme Court. Since 1961, the commission 
has made 32 recommendations to the Supreme Court to 
censure or remove a judge. The Court upheld the 
recommendations in 29 cases; one case is pending. 
I 
Proposal 
This constitutional amendment changes the 
composition of the commission and makes a number of 
changes to the .procedures for disciplining judges. Among 
its provisions, the measure increases the membership of 
the commission from nine to eleven members and 
increases the number of public members so that they are 
a majority on the commission. Specifically, the members 
would include three judges, who would be appointed by 
the Supreme Court; two members of the State Bar of 
California, who would be appointed by the Governor; and 
six public members (two representatives appointed by 
each of the following: the Governor, the Senate Rules 
Committee, and the Speaker of the Assembly). 
The amendment provides that, when the commission 
begins formal proceedings against a judge, the charges 
and all subsequent papers and proceedings shall be open 
to the public. Also, this measure permits the commission, 
rather than the Supreme Court, to retire or remove a 
judge, or to censure a judge or former judge. Such actions 
could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. In a case 
against a Supreme Court Justice, a special panel of 
appellate court judges would review the case. The 
measure also permits the commission to publicly 
re~rimand a judge without the judge's consent. The 
commission could disqualify a judge from performing his 
or her duties when the commission begins a formal 
proceeding that charges the judge with misconduct or 
disability. The commission also may bar a former judge 
who has been censured or removed from receiving a 
judicial appointment or assignment to serve any 
California state court. 
The measure provides that persons who give 
statements to the commission are protected from civil 
lawsuits or adverse actions that may be taken against 
them by their employers as a result of their statements. 
Also, it protects commission members and employees 
against lawsuits that may be brought as a result of their 
work. 
Finally, the amendment requires the commission to 
provide, upon request of the Governor of any state, the 
President of the United States, and the California 
Commission on Judicial Appointments, confidential 
information on disciplinary actions taken against a judge 
who is an applicant for another judicial appointment. 
Fiscal Effect 
This measure is not likely to have a significant fiscal 
impact on the state because its changes are largely 
procedural in nature. 
For the text of Proposition 190 see page 18 
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Commission on Judicial Performance. 
Legislative Constitutional Amendment. 
Argument in Favor of Proposition 190 
THE TIME HAS COME TO REFORM hold judges to the same standard where serious 
CALIFORNIA'S JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SYSTEM. misconduct is at issue. 
VOTE "YES" ON PROPOSITION 190. PROPOSITION 190 STOPS JUDGES FROM 
In 1960, California created the first judicial discipline ESCAPING DISCIPLINE BY RETIRING OR 
commission in the United States. It was a model for all RESIGNING WITH CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT 
50 states and the District of Columbia. But now PENDING AGAINST THEM. 
California has fallen behind the rest of the nation. A Proposition 190 will prevent judges charged with 
system that was once innovative has become antiquated. misconduct from avoiding discipline by retiring or 
The California commission, which is made up of a resigning with charges pending. Judges should be held 
majority of judges, has held only one public hearing in the accountable for improper conduct on the bench. 
last six years. Clearly, it is inappropriate to have judges Proposition 190 allows the commission to publicly 
disciplining their peers in a secret environment. discipline former judges for conduct which occurred while 
PROPOSITION 190 ENSURES PUBLIC CONTROL they held judicial office. This will provide the public with 
OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE. important information about judges who resign with 
The California commission is currently composed of charges pending and then go to work in the private sector 
five judges, two lawyers and two public citizens and there as arbitrators or private judges. 
is no requirement that formal disciplinary proceedings be Proposition 190 is an important and timely reform 
open to the public. Proposition 190 would eliminate measure. Judges are public servants and playa critical 
judicial domination of the commission in favor of a public role in our society. The public must have confidence and 
majority. Specifically, under Proposition 190, the trust in those holdingJ'udicial office. PROPOSITION 190 
Commission on Judicial Performance would be made up S OF 
of three judges, two attorneys and six public members. PLACES JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN THE HAND 
A PUBLIC MAJORITY WILL ENSURE A FAIR AND A BROAD PANEL OF PUBLIC CITIZENS, JUDGES 
AND ATTORNEYS AND OPENS ALL FORMAL 
FIRM SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE. PROCEEDINGS TO THE PUBLIC. JUST AS OTHER 
THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW WHEN STATES HAVE DONE IN RECENT YEARS, 
JUDGES ARE CHARGED WITH MISCONDUCT. , CALIFORNIA MUST ELIMINATE SECRECY AND 
Under Proposition 190, the commission would be ENSURE INTEGRITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY 
required to open all formal proceedings against judges to PROCESS. 
the public. Currently, all hearings and com.mission VOTE ''YES'' ON PROPOSITION 190. 
documents, including the actual charges agamst the 
judge, are secret. WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF 
CHARGES OR PROCEEDINGS, THE PUBLIC 
CANNOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM. Just as we require criminal proceedings and 
attorney discipline proceedings to be open, we should also 
WILLIE L. BROWN, JR. 
Speaker, California State Assembly 
ALFRED E. ALQUIST 
California State Senator 
MARC POCHE 
Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal 
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 190 
There's no question but that the current system of Commission on Judicial Performance should be 
hearings by the California Commission on Judicial comprised equally of judges, public members and lawyers 
Performance should be changed. There's no argument in order to balance viewpoints and distribute the power 
about that. Creating a requirement of open, public of appointment among the branches of government. 
hea~ngs re~pect~n~ the relatively fe~ form~l complaints Appointments should reflect the diversit~ of Cali~o~nia's 
agamst Cahforma.Ju?ge~, howev~r~ IS far dIff~rent from population and not be made on the baSIS of POhtICS or 
turnip.g the C.ommIsslOn m~o.a pohtIcally-appom~ed body. ideology. The Commission's independence must be 
That s. the VICe of Pr.opo~ItlOn 190. I!lstead sImply?f protected from the appearance of outside interference. 
chan.gmg the ConstIt~tI0n. to reqUIre open, p,;!bhc . We should reject Proposition 190 and re-write it with the 
hearmgs of charges agams~ Judge~ (whI~h ar~ relatIvely public hearing requirement and equal power of 
fe~ ~ompared to the ~,OOO Judges m Caht:orma) Speaker appointment among the branches of state government. 
WIlhe Brown has wntten a measure whIch transcends 
that elemental principle. While it may seem difficult to QUENTIN L. KOPP 
divorce the desired constitutional revision in the nature State Senator 
of the hearings on judicial discipline from the selection (Independent·San Francisco/San Mateo) 
process for the Commission, Californians should realiz.e JUDGE JOSEPH A. WAPNER 
it is injurious to our separation of powers form of Retired Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court 
government and the independence of the judicial branch ARLEIGH WOODS 
of government to adopt Proposition 190. Rather, as the Presiding Justice, California Court of Appeal 
American Bar Association has stated, the members of the 
12 Arguments printed o~ this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency. G94 
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190 Legislative Constitutional Amendment. 
Argument Against Proposition 190 
DON'T BE FOOLED! This alleged attempt to regulate 
the judiciary is really an attempt to politicize the 
Commission on Judicial Performance. This power grab 
changes the structure of the Commission by allowing 
politicians to appoint a majority of its members. Eight 
out of the 11 members would be appointed by politicians, 
giving them a degree of power over the judicial branch 
unknown anywhere else in the United States. 
The public needs a judicial disciplinary system 
uninfluenced by partisan politics. Proceedings before the 
Commission should be opened to the public, but this 
proposal threatens the independence of the Commission 
and will divert its focus to the expectations of the 
appointing parties. 
There is a better alternative, which the Legislature 
ignored. The American Bar Association has just 
completed a five year study conducted by prominent 
citizens, judges and lawyers and adopted its first 
national model for judicial disciplinary proceedings. The 
model recommends a commission with equal numbers of 
citizens, judges, and lawyers appointed by the Governor, 
State Supreme Court and the State Bar. This measure, 
however, takes the commendable, worthwhile goal of 
producing an accountable, open system of judicial 
discipline and turns it into a dangerous, irresponsible 
attack on the judicial branch of government. Its proposed 
commission has virtually unchecked power; its so-called 
"public member majority" in reality will be a majority of 
people with close political ties to the Governor, the 
Assembly Speaker and State Senate leadership. 
The framers of our Constitution knew that an 
independent judiciary is one of the greatest safeguards of 
liberty. While California needs a strong, effective 
Commission on Judicial Performance, it does not need 
. and can't afford, an ill-conceived, poorly drafted 
constitutional amendment which gives a handful of 
insiders unprecedented control over judicial conduct. 
The proposal also removes disciplinary powers from 
the California Supreme Court and transfers such powers 
to the politicized Commission. Such shift raises serious 
due process issues and will result in costly and needless 
litigation at taxpayer expense. 
Vote No! California deserves a judiciary that is 
accountable and independent. Send a message to the 
Legislature to keep partisan politics out of the judicial 
disciplinary process. Send them back to the drawing 
board to examine the work done by leading national 
authorities and give California a system which will place 
us in the forefront of judicial discipline. 
QUENTIN L. KOPP 
State Senator 
(I-San Francisco/$an Mateo) 
JUDGE JOSEPH A. WAPNER 
Retired Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court 
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 190 
The opponents claim that Proposition 190 will create a 
politicized body. TWENTY-FOUR STATES HAVE 
CREATED COMMISSIONS WITH EQUAL OR 
GREATER PUBLIC MEMBERSHIP ON THEIR 
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY COMMISSIONS. These 
commissions represent a variety of appointing powers. 
Just as with Proposition 190; these states recognized 
that a broad base of constitutional appointing powers 
does not sacrifice the integrity of the Judiciary .. 
IN FACT, NO STATE HAS ADOPTED THE ABA 
MODEL. Instead, a number of states have successfully 
changed to a public majority membership after having 
commissions dominated by judges. The drafters of the 
ABA model specifically refused to recommend that 
disciplinary commissions have a majority of public 
members because they thought the issues would be too 
complicated. Everyday, jurors are asked to decide serious 
legal issues, yet the lawyers and judges who drafted the 
ABA proposal feared the public would not understand 
when a judge has acted inappropriately. 
PROPOSITION 190 WILL CREATE A MORE 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION BY MAKING IT AN 
INSTITUTION SEPARATE' FROM ANY ONE 
INFLUENCING BODY. Proposition 190 specifically 
provides for a broad base of appointing powers-the 
Supreme Court, the Governor, and the Legislature-so 
that no one branch of government can dominate this 
important body. 
Proposition 190 protects the public by providing for 
their participation. It is good, sound public policy. 
VOTE ''YES'' ON PROPOSITION 190. 
WILLIE L. BROWN, JR. 
Speaker, California State Assembly 
ALFRED E. ALQUIST 
California State Senator 
TERRY B. O'ROURKE 
Judge, San Diego Superior Court 
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Proposition 189: Text of Proposed Law 
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional 
Amendment 37 (Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter 95) 
expressly amends the Constitution by amending a 
section thereof; therefore, new provisions proposed to be 
added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are 
new. 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 
SEC. 12. A person shall be released on bail by 
sufficient sureties, except for: 
(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the 
presumption great; 
(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on 
another person, or felony sexual assault offenses on 
another person, when the facts are evident or· the 
presumption great and the court finds based upon clear 
and convincing evidence that there is a substantial 
likelihood the person's release would result in great 
bodily harm to others; or 
(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the 
presumption great and the court finds based on clear and 
convincing evidence that the person has threatened 
another with great bodily harm and that there is a 
substantial likelihood that the person would carry out 
the threat if released. 
Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the 
amount of bail, the court shall take into consideration the 
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal 
record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her 
appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. 
A person may be released on his or her own 
recognizance in the court's discretion. 
Proposition 190: Text of Proposed Law 
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional 
Amendment 46 (Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter 
111) expressly amends the Constitution by adding a 
section thereto and amending sections thereof; therefore, 
existing provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in 
strike9ut type and new provisions proposed to be added 
are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new. 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE VI 
First-That Section 8 of Article VI thereof is amended 
to read: 
SEC. 8. (a) The Commission on Judicial 
Performance consists of 2 judges 9f G9urts 9f appeal, 2 
judges 9f superi9r G9urts one judge of a court of appeal, 
one judge of a superior court, and one judge of a 
municipal court, each appointed by the Supreme Court; 2 
members of the State Bar of California who have 
practiced law in this State for 10 years, each appointed 
by its g9veming b9dy the Governor; and 2 6 citizens who 
are not judges, retired judges, or members of the State 
Bar of California, app9inted by the G9vern9r and 
appr9ved by the Senate, a maj9rity 9f the membership 
G9nGUrring 2 of whom shall be appointed by the Governor, 
2 by the Senate Committee on Rules, and 2 by the Speaker 
of the Assembly. Except as provided in subdivision (b), all 
terms are for 4 years. No member shall serve more than 2 
4-year terms, or for more than a total of 10 years if 
appointed to fill a vacancy. . 
Commission membership terminates if a member 
ceases to hold the position that qualified the member for 
appointment. A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing 
power for the remainder of the term. A member whose 
term has expired may continue to serve until the vacancy 
has been filled by the appointing power. Appointing 
powers may appoint members who are already serving on 
the commission prior to March 1, 1995, to a single 2-year 
term, but may not appoint them to an additional term 
thereafter. 
(b) To create staggered terms among the members of 
the Commission on Judicial Performance, the following 
members shall be appointed, as follows: 
(1) The G9urt 9f appeal member app9inted t9 
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immediately sUGGeed the term that expires 9n N9vember 
3, 1933, shall serve a 2 year term. 
(2) Of the State Bar members app9inted t9 
immediately sUGGeed terms that expire 9n DeGember 31, 
1933, 9ne member shall serve f9r a 2 year term. 
(1) Two members appointed by the Supreme Court to a 
term commencing March 1, 1995, shall each serve a term 
of 2 years and may be reappointed to one full term. 
(2) One attorney appointed by the Governor to a term 
commencing March 1, 1995, shall serve a term of 2 years 
and may be reappointed to one full term. 
(3) One citizen member appointed by the Governor to a 
term commencing March 1, 1995, shall serve a term of 2 
years and may be reappointed to one full term. 
(4) One member appointed by the Senate Committee on 
Rules to a term commencing March 1, 1995, shall serve a 
term of 2 years and may be reappointed to one full term. 
(5) One member appointed by the Speaker of the 
Assembly to a term commencing March 1, 1995, shall 
serve a term of 2 years and may be reappointed to one full 
term. 
(6) All other members shall be appointed to full 4-year 
terms commencing March 1, 1995. 
Second-That Section 18 of Article VI thereof is 
amended to read: 
SEC. 18. (a) Ajudge is disqualified from acting as a 
judge, without loss of salary, while there is pending (1) an 
indictment or an informatian charging the judge in the 
United States with a crime punishable as a felony under 
California or federal law, or (2) a reG9mmendati9n 
petition to the Supreme Court to review a determination 
by the Commission on Judicial Performance fur rem9val 
9r retirement 9f the to remove or retire a judge. 
(b) On reG.9mmendati9n Gf the The Commission on 
Judicial Performance may disqualify a judge from acting 
as a judge, without loss of salary, upon notice of formal 
proceedings by the commission charging the judge with 
judicial misconduct or disability. 
(c) The Commission on Judicial Performance Gr Gn its 
Gwn m9tiGn, the Supreme CGurt may shall suspend a 
judge from office without salary when in the United 
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States the judge pleads guilty or no contest or is found 
guilty of a crime punishable as a felony under California 
or federal law or of any other crime that involves moral 
turpitude under that law. If the conviction is reversed, 
suspension terminates, and the judge shall be paid the 
salary for the judicial office held by the judge for the 
period of suspension. If the judge is suspended and the 
conviction becomes final, the Supreme Court Commission 
on Judicial Performance shall remove the judge from 
office. 
(c) On recommendation of 
(d) Except as provided in subdivision (fJ, the 
Commission on Judicial Performance the SQpreme Court 
may (1) retire a judge for disability that seriously 
interferes with the performance of the judge's duties and 
is or is likely to become permanent, and or (2) censure a 
judge or former judge or remove a judge for action 
occurring not more than 6 years prior to the 
commencement of the judge's current term or of the 
former judge's last term that constitutes wHf:ul. willful 
misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to 
perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the 
use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudIcial to the 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office 
into disrepute. The Commission on Judicial Performance 
may-, or (3) publicly or privately admonish a judge or 
former judge found to have engaged in an improper 
action or dereliction of duty, subject to review in the 
Supreme Court in the manner provided for review of 
causes decided by a CQurt of appeal. The commission may 
also bar a former judge who has been censured from 
receiving an assignment, appointment, or reference of 
work from any California state court. Upon petition by the 
judge or former judge, the Supreme Court may, in its 
discretion, grant review of a determination by the 
commission to retire, remove, censure, admonish, or 
disqualify pursuant to subdivision (b) a judge or former 
judge. When the Supreme Court reviews a determination 
of the commission, it may make an independent review of 
the record. If the Supreme Court has not acted within 120 
days after granting the petition, the decision of the 
commission shall be final. 
~ 
(e) A judge retired by the Supreme Court commissio.n 
shall be considered to have retired voluntarily. A judge 
removed by the Supreme Court commission is ineligible 
for judicial office, including receiving an assignment, 
appointment, or reference of work from any California 
state court, and pending further order of the court is , 
suspended from practicing law in this State. The State 
Bar may institute appropriate attorney disciplinary 
proceedings against any judge who retires or resigns from 
office with judicial disciplinary charges pending. 
~ 
(fJ A recomme:adation of determination by the 
Commission on Judicial Performance ~ to admonish 
or censure , removal or retirement of a judge or former 
judge of the Supreme Court or remove or retire a judge of 
the Supreme Court shall be determined reviewed by a 
tribunal of 7 court of appeal judges selected by lot. 
(£) If, after conducting a preliminary investigation, the 
Commission on Judicial Performance by vote determines 
that formal proceedings should be instituted: 
(1) The judge or judges charged may re(}uire that 
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formal hearings be public, unless the Commission on 
Judicial Perfurmance by vot,e finds good cause fur 
confidential hearings. 
(2) The Commission on Judicial Performance may, 
without further review in the Supreme Court, issue a 
public reproval with the consent of the judge fur conduct 
warranting discipline. The public reproval shall include 
an enumeration of any and all formal charges brought 
against the judge which have not been dismissed by the 
commission. 
(3) The Commission on Judicial Performance may in 
the pursuit of public confidence and the interests of 
justice, issue press statements or releases or, in the event 
charges involve moral turpitude, dishonesty, or 
. corruption, open hearings to the public. 
(g) The Commission on Judicial ,Perfurmance may 
issue explanatory statements at any investigatory stage 
,.,,'hen the subject matter is generally knewn to the public. 
(h) The Judicial Council shall make rules 
implementing this section and providing for 
confidentiality of proceedings. 
(g) No court, except the Supreme Court, shall have 
jurisdiction in a civil action or other legal proceeding of 
any sort brought against the commission by a judge. Any 
request for injunctive relief or other provisional remedy 
shall be granted or denied within 90 days of the filing of 
the request for relief A failure to comply with the time 
requirements of this section does not affect the validity of 
commission proceedings. 
(h) Members of the commission, the commission staff, 
and the examiners and investigators employed by the 
commission shall be absolutely immune from suit for all 
conduct at any time in the course of their official duties. 
No civil action may be maintained against a person, or 
adverse employment action taken against a person, by any 
employer, public or private, based on statements presented 
by the person to the commission. 
(i) The Commission on Judicial Performance shall 
make rules implementing this section, including, but not 
limited to, the following: 
(1) The commission shall make rules for the 
investigation of judges. The commission may provide for 
the confidentiality of complaints to and investigations by 
the commission. 
(2) The commission shall make rules for formal 
proceedings against judges when there is cause to believe 
there is a disability or wrongdoing within the meaning of 
subdivision (d). 
(j) When the commission institutes formal proceedings, 
the notice of charges, the answer, and all subsequent 
papers and proceedings shall be open to the public for fLll 
formal proceedings instituted after February 28, 1995. 
(k) The commission may make explanatory statements. 
(l) The budget of the commission shall be separate from 
the budget of any other state agency or court. 
(m) The Supreme Court shall make rules for the 
conduct of judges, both on and off the bench, and for 
judicial candidates in the conduct of their campaigns. 
These rules shall be referred to as the Code of Judicial 
Ethics. 
Third-That Section 18.5 is added toArticle VI thereof, 
to read: 
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SEC. 18.5. (a) Upon request, the Commission on 
Judicial Performance shall provide to the Governor of any 
State of the Union the text of any private admonishment, 
advisory letter, or other disciplinary action together with 
any, information that the Commission on Judicial 
Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of 
the commission's action, with respect to any applicant 
whom the Governor of any State of the Union indicates is 
under consideration for any judicial appointment. 
(b) Upon request, the Commission on Judicial 
Performance shall provide the President of the United 
States the text of any private admonishment, advisory 
letter, or other disciplinary action together with any 
information that the Commission on Judicial 
Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of 
the commission's action, with respect to any applicant 
whom the President indicates is under consideration for 
any federal judicial appointment. 
(c) Upon request, the Commission on Judicial 
Performance shall provide the Commission on Judicial 
Appointments the text of any private admonishment, 
advisory letter, or other disciplinary action together with 
any information that the Commission on Judicial 
Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of 
the commission action, with respect to any applicant 
whom the Commission on Judicial Appointments 
indicates is under consideration for any judicial 
appointment. 
(d) All information released under this section shall 
remain confidential and privileged. 
(e) Notwithstanding subdivision (d), any information 
released pursuant to this section shall also be provided to 
the applicant about whom the information was requested. 
(fJ "Private admonishment" refers toa disciplinary 
action against a judge by the Commission on Judicial 
Performance as authorized by subdivision (c) of Section 
18 of Article VI, as amended November 8, 1988. 
Fourth-That this measure shall become operative on 
March 1, 1995. 
· Proposition 191: Text of Proposed Law 
This amendment proposed by Senate Constitutional 
Amendment 7 (Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter 113) 
expressly amends the Constitution by amending sections 
thereof; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be 
deleted are printed in Strik8Qut t¥P8 and new provisions 
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate 
that they are new. 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE VI 
First-That Section ,I of Article VI thereof is amended 
to read: 
SEC. 1. The judicial power of this State is vested in 
the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and 
municipal courts, and justiG8 GQurts. All courts are, 
courts of record. 
Second-That Section 5 of ATticle VI ,thereof is 
amended to read: . 
SEC. 5. (a) Each county shall be divided into 
municipal court and justiG8 GQurt districts as provided by 
statute, but a city may not be divided into more than one 
district. Each municipal and justiG8 court shall have one 
or more judges. Each municipal court district shall have 
no fewer than 40,000 residents; provided that each county 
shall have at least one municipal court district. The 
number of residents shall be determined as provided by 
statute. 
(b) On the operative date of this subdivision, all 
existing justice courts shall become municipal courts, and 
the number, qualifications, and compensation' of judges, 
officers, attaches, and employees shall continue until 
changed by the Legislature. Each judge of a part-time 
municipal court is deemed to have agreed to serve full 
time and shall be available for assignment by the Chief 
Justice for the balance of time necessary to comprise a 
full-time workload. 
Th8re shall 08 a muniGipal GQurt in 8aGh distrlGt Qf 
mQr8 than 40,000 r8sidents and a jUStiG8 GQurt in 8aGh 
distriGt gf 40,000 resid8nts Qr 18ss. Th8 num08r Qf 
r8sidents shall 08 aSG8rtain8d as prQvid8d O¥ statut8. 
(c) The Legislature shall provide for the organization 
and prescribe the jurisdiction of municipal and juStiG8 
20 
courts. It shall prescribe for each municipal court aad 
prQvid8 fur 8aGh juStiG8 GQurt the number, qualifications, 
and compensation of judges, officers, and employees. 
(.b) 
(d) Notwithstanding th8 prQvisiQns Qf subdivision (a), 
any city in San Diego County may be divided into more 
than one municipal court Qr juStiG8 GQurt district if the 
Legislature determines that unusual geographic 
conditions warrant such division. 
Third-That Section 6 of Article VI thereof is amended 
to read: 
SEC. 6. The Judicial Council consists of the Chief 
Justice and one other judge of the Supreme Court, 3 
judges of courts of appeal, 5 judges of superior courts, g 
and 5 judges of municipal courts, and 2 jUdg8S QfjustiG8 
GQurts, each appointed by the Chief Justice for a 2-year 
term; 4 members of the State Bar appointed by its 
governing body for 2-year terms; and one member of each 
house of the Legislature appointed as provided by the 
house. 
Council membership terminates if a member ceases to 
hold the position that qualified the member for 
appointment. A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing 
power for the remainder of the term. 
The council may appoint an Administrative Director of 
the Courts, who serves at its pleasure and performs 
functions delegated by the councilor the Chief Justice, 
other than adopting rules of ,court administration, 
practice and procedure. 
To improve the administration of justice the council 
shall survey judicial . business and make 
recommendations to the courts, make recommendations 
annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for 
court administration, practice and procedure, not 
inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions 
prescribed by statute. 
The Chief Justice shall seek to expedite judicial 
,business and to equalize the work of judges. The Chief 
Justice may provide for the assignment of any judge to 
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